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P O L I C Y  AND U . S .  - MEXICO 
TRADE RELATIONS 
D i a l o g u e  A19 
By: Raul Monzarz 
G e o r g e  S a m u e l s  
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Professor of Economics at Sam Houston State University in 
Huntsville, Texas. Dr. Samuels' research focuses on the 
Mexican economy and on monetary and financial questions. 
This paper was presented at the recent Mexico City meeting 
of the Latin American Studies Association. 
Mark B. Rosenberg 
Director 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper p resen t s  evidence of r ecen t  events  i n  Mexico 
leading t o  t h e  c u r r e n t  c r i s i s ,  Sect ion I1 exp la ins  t h e  theo- 
r e t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  quan t i ty  theory of money, t h e  
exchange r a t e ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  l e v e l  of p r i c e s  and t h e  purchasing 
power p a r i t y  paradigm. The r o l e  played by t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  
of imported and domestic goods i s  explored, a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
l i n k  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  exchange r a t e  through r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  and 
t h e  purchasing power p a r i t y  paradigm. The second p a r t  of t h i s  
s e c t i o n  d iscusses  t h e  exchange r a t e  and how it r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  
terms of t r ade .  A s h o r t  overview of exchange c o n t r o l s  follows, 
with emphasis on t h e  r ecen t  Mexican experience.  The pol icy  
impl ica t ions  of exchange con t ro l ,  i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  f i s c a l  
and monetary p o l i c i e s ,  and t h e  balance of payments is  s tudied .  
The "Decree Regarding Generalized Exchange Control" signed i n t o  
law by then p res iden t  JosQLbpez-Port i l lo  on September 1, 1982 
i s  reviewed. 
Sect ion 111 looks a t  cu r ren t  problems f o r  Mexico, including 
expor ts ,  i n f l a t i o n ,  unemployment and imports of production goods. 
Sect ion I V  examines t h e  corresponding problems f o r  t h e  U,S, 
Exports, unemployment and loans t o  Mexico a r e  included. Sect ion V 
b r i e f l y  d iscusses  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  under IMF guide l ines .  F ina l ly ,  
some genera l  observat ions and cursory comments a r e  made regarding 
the c u r r e n t  Mexican economic c r i s i s ,  
I. RECENT MEXICAN EXPERIENCE 
The c u r r e n t  economic problems i n  Mexico c l e a r l y  demonstrate 
t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  environment can r e s t r a i n  
growth. But what p r e c i p i t a t e d  t h i s  c r i s i s ?  Th i r ty  years  of in-  
ward looking, import s u b s t i t u t i o n  based growth have slowed sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1970's. When Lopez P o r t i l l o  took o f f i c e  
i n  1976, i n f l a t i o n  was t h i r t y  percent ,  and Mexico owed $26 b i l l i o n  
t o  fore ign  banks. Through a program of a u s t e r i t y ,  i n f l a t i o n  slowed. 
Aggregate demand cont rac ted ,  due t o  t h e  a u s t e r i t y  program a s  wel l  
a s  a sharp  drop i n  investment a f t e r  t h e  1976 devaluation. 
During 1977, GNP grew a t  3.3%, with p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  confidence 
increas ing  a t  a r ap id  pace. Dol l a r i za t ion  and c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  were 
reduced. I n  1978, GDP grew a t  7.0 percent  i n  r e a l  terms, while 
i n f l a t i o n  dropped t o  1 6  percent  from 2 1  percent  t h e  previous year.  
The turnaround has been a t t r i b u t e d  t o  increased investment and ex- 
p o r t s ,  o r  more s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  t h e  success  of t h e  new government 
( inc luding  both f i s c a l  and monetary p o l i c i e s ) ,  and t h e  new o i l  
boom. By 1981, Mexico was producing 2.5 b i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  per  
day--the world 's  four th  l a r g e s t  producer. 
The o i l  wealth seemed t o  j u s t i f y  an ambitious development 
plan,  including a n a t i o n a l  system of support  f o r  b a s i c  a g r i c u l t u r e  
(deemphasized i n  t h e  mid-s ix t ies )  , and a plan t o  b u i l d  twenty 
nuclear  r eac to r s .  From 1978-1981, r e a l  government expenditures 
grew a t  an average r a t e  of 14.9 percent  per  year.  The money supply 
was increased 33 percent  pe r  year .  P r i v a t e  f ixed  investment spend- 
i n g  increased  a t  an annual r a t e  of 13.6 percent ,  and consumption 
8.2 percent .  GDP averaged 8.0 percent  growth. 
Confidence i n  o i l  revenues and a d e s i r e  t o  pursue rap id  indus- 
t r i a l  expansion l ed  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  markets. Externa l  
f inancing was abundant and r e l a t i v e l y  cheap, From 1978-1981, ex- 
t e r n a l  pub l i c  debt  increased  from 26.2 t o  53.0 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  
Increased d e f i c i t  spending by t h e  government, a s  we l l  a s  higher  
l e v e l s  of p r i v a t e  investment and consumption expenditures ,  generated 
excess demand and renewed i n f l a t i o n a r y  pressures .  Fortunately,  
r e a l  GDP grew (over 8.0 percent)  a s  we l l  a s  imports, both of which 
moderated i n f l a t i o n .  I n f l a t i o n  gradual ly widened t h e  c u r r e n t  account 
d e f i c i t  a s  t h e  peso became more overvalued. Many expor ts  were d i s -  
couraged and imports grew rap id ly ,  
Mexico's Global Development Plan of 1980 requi red  high o i l  
p r i c e s  and expor t  revenues. When these  dipped i n  e a r l y  1981, some 
o i l  producing coun t r i e s  began discounting t h e i r  p r i c e s  i n  response 
t o  t h e  weak market, bu t  Mexico he ld  ou t ,  Mexico continued t o  borrow 
t o  f inance growth and debt  se rv ice ,  A s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  rose ,  in-  
creased amounts of fore ign  borrowing were requi red  t o  cover debt  
se rv ice ,  leaving  l e s s  f o r  investment. I n  add i t ion ,  t h e  recess ion  
i n  t h e  U.S. l imi ted  growth of non-oil exports .  
Same c o r r e c t i v e  measures were introduced i n  l a t e  1981, includ- 
ing  some f i s c a l  a u s t e r i t y ,  a mild devaluat ion of t h e  peso, and 
re in t roduc t ion  of import l icens ing .  Even so ,  t h e  year  ended with a 
record inc rease  i n  borrowing by t h e  pub l i c  s e c t o r ,  and a cu r ren t  
account d e f i c i t  of 11 .7bi l l ion  d o l l a r s .  
I n  February of 1982, t h e  peso was allowed t o  f l o a t .  I t  depre- 
c i a t e d  30 percent  immediately, and 18 percent  more by May. The 
government i n s t i t u t e d  more " s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e , "  inc luding  a reduct ion 
i n  t h e  r a t i o  of t h e  d e f i c i t  t o  GNP,  p r i c e  c o n t r o l s  on c e r t a i n  bas ic  
products,  and l i m i t s  on pub l i c  s e c t o r  and p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  imports. 
I t  was hoped these  p o l i c i e s  would reduce c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  and 
imports, and increase  exports .  
The Minis te r  of Finance and Public  Cred i t  met with I M F  
o f f i c i a l s  i n  August, and reached an agreement t o  he lp  Mexico re-  
s t r u c t u r e  i t s  fo re ign  debt  and a t t r a c t  fore ign  exchange. The I M F  
w i l l  provide Mexico 3.6 b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  i n  SDR's over t h e  next  
t h r e e  years ,  based on Mexico's exe rc i s ing  budgetary a u s t e r i t y  and 
con t rac t ing  fewer fore ign  loans.  On September 1 Mexico es t ab l i shed  
both f i s c a l  and monetary pol icy  d i r e c t e d  a t  c o n t r o l l i n g  and s t a b i -  
l i z i n g  t h e  economy. Banlcs were na t iona l i zed  and t h e  con t ro l  of 
fore ign  exchange was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d .  The IMF, a t  t h e i r  annual 
meeting of September 6 ,  i n  Toronto, backed Mexico by assur ing  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  community of Mexico's commitment t o  duly pay o f f  i t s  
fore ign  debt ,  a f t e r  completing a process of f i n a n c i a l  adjustments. 1 
The l e t t e r  of i n t e n t  signed by Mexico and t h e  IMF i n  November 
1982, descr ibed a t h r e e  year  program t o  reduce t h e  s i z e  of t h e  
d e f i c i t  from 16.5 percent  of GDP t o  3.5 percent  by 1987. These re- 
duct ions w i l l  n e c e s s i t a t e  major c u t s  i n  pub l i c  spending. Monetary 
pol icy  i s  cons t ra ined  by a l i m i t  on c e n t r a l  bank f inancing of t h e  
pub l i c  s e c t o r  d e f i c i t  and encouraging inc reases  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
Wage pol icy  i s  expected t o  be conservat ive.  
11. EXCHANGE RATES AND EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
Exchange Rates and t h e  
Quan t i ty  Theory 
An exchange r a t e  i s  descr ibed a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  of one cur- 
rency i n  t e r m s  of another.  A s  a p r i c e  it i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  
of t h e  market fo rces  of supply and demand. Exchange r a t e s  a r e  
s e n s i t i v e  po in t s  of economic con tac t  between count r ies .  This i s  
because of t h e  impact t h a t  the  l e v e l  of t h e  r a t e  of exchange has on 
t h e  p r i c e s  of domestic goods i n  t e r m s  of imports; on t h e  balance of 
payments and t h e  c u r r e n t  account and on aggregate demand, among 
o the r s .  Exchange r a t e s  e q u i l i b r a t e  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  flow of goods, 
s e r v i c e s  and c a p i t a l .  
The most important determinant of exchange r a t e s  is  t h e  p r i c e s  
of goods and s e r v i c e s  i n  t h e  domestic country r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
p r i c e s  of goods and se rv ices  i n  t h e  fore ign  country,  a r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  purchasing power p a r i t y  theorem. This 
theorem has proven t o  be t h e  most c o n s i s t e n t  economic theory re- 
l a t e d  t o  exchange r a t e s  and foreign/domestic p r i c e  determination. 
Even though t h e  purchasing power p a r i t y  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  competi- 
t iveness  i s  only one of many determinants a f f e c t i n g  t h e  r a t e  of 
exchange, t h e  l i n k  between domestic p r i c e s  and fo re ign  p r i c e s  can 
be es t ab l i shed  by a simple geometric model developed by K. W. 
Clements. 2 
Clements uses t h e  monetar is t  approach i n  t h e  establ ishment  
and determination of exchange r a t e s .  I n  expla in ing  exchange r a t e  
behavior, Clements emphasizes t h e  r o l e  of t h e  money market a s  a 
determinant of t h e  equi l ibr ium leve l .  Clementsf model analyzes 
two b a s i c  condi t ions  i n  t h e  determination of t h e  r a t e  of exchange. 
The f i r s t  i s  a  case where it i s  assumed t h a t  a l l  goods and ser- 
v ices  a r e  t raded i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y ,  while t h e  second case includes 
a  non-traded goods extension. 
Analyzing Clements' f i r s t  p a r t  of t h e  model, i f  w e  l e t  L be 
t h e  demand f o r  r e a l  cash balances,  Y r e a l  income, i t h e  nominal 
r a t e  of i n t e r e s t  then w e  know t h a t  
L = f  ( y , i )  
L e t  Mo be t h e  nominal q u a n t i t y  of money, P be t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  and 
(Mo) 
-
Mo 
( P  be t h e  supply of r e a l  balances,  then L ( y , i )  = P with 
140 
- 
P = L ( y , i ) .  I f  we assume t h a t  equi l ibr ium i n  t h e  domestic money 
market i s  determined by p r i c e s ,  Clements then e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t h e  
quan t i ty  theory r e s u l t s  i n  a  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  of p r i c e s  and t h e  
money supply. He f u r t h e r  concluded t h a t  
1. A r i s e  i n  t h e  money supply inc reases  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  i n  
t h e  same proportion. 
2 .  A rise i n  t h e  r e a l  q u a n t i t y  of money demanded causes t h e  
p r i c e  l e v e l s  t o  f a l l  propor t ional ly .  
Clementsf b a s i c  equation i s  expressed a s  follows: 
P = p r i c e  l e v e l  i n  t h e  domestic country 
S = exchange r a t e  ( t h e  p r i c e  of fo re ign  currency i n  t e r m s  of 
domestic currency) 
p*= t h e  fore ign  p r i c e  l e v e l  
Then p = s x p*, which shows t h a t  t h e  exchange r a t e  equa l i zes  t h e  
p r i c e  of goods and se rv ices  i n  a l t e r n a t i v e  currency. 
Mo 
- Since t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  a t  home was expressed a s  P = L ( y , i )  , sub- 
1 Mo 
-- 
s t i t u t i n g  t h e  exchange r a t e  S = p* L ( y , i )  which e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  
exchange r a t e  i n  terms of t h e  domestic demand and supply of money I 
and fore ign  p r i c e s  p*. 
Clements introduced t h e  model r e l a t i n g  t h e  demand and supply I 
f o r  money with t h e  purchasing power p a r i t y  theory i n  t h e  e s t a b l i s h -  I 
ment of t h e  exchange r a t e  a s  follows: 
P 
Figure 1 
Figure 1 shows t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between money and p r i ces .  Assuming 
t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  income (yo) and i n i t i a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  ( i o )  a r e  
he ld  constant ,  then an expansion i n  t h e  money supply from Mo t o  M 1  
causes t h e  p r i c e  t o  r a i s e  from Po t o  P1. I n  t r y i n g  t o  keep t h e  
r e a l  balances cons tant ,  t h e  percent  increase  i n  p r i c e s  must equal  
t h e  percent  inc rease  i n  t h e  money supply. 
I n  t h e  purchasing power p a r i t y  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  
i n i t i a l  r a t e  of exchange So and fore ign  p r i c e s  P* i s  given. Clements 
e s t a b l i s h e s  t h a t  domestic monetary expansion from Mo t o  M 1 ,  wi th 
domestic p r i c e s  inc reas ing  from Po t o  P 1  holding P* cons tant ,  de- 
p r e c i a t e s  t h e  fore ign  exchange t o  S1. He concludes t h a t  t h e  percent  
deprec ia t ion  i n  t h e  fore ign  exchange must equal  t h e  percent  ex- 
pansion of t h e  money supply. This has t h e  same e f f e c t  a s  a  r i s e  i n  
domestic i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  (i).  A r i s e  i n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  due t o  in- 
f l a t i o n a r y  expecta t ions  induces people t o  economize i n  t h e i r  hold- 
i n g  of monies, inc reas ing  p r i c e s  and deprec ia t ing  t h e  exchange r a t e .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, inc reases  i n  r e a l  income (Y), assuming 
t h a t  Mo and i o  remain cons tant ,  causes domestic p r i c e s  t o  f a l l .  
With lower domestic p r i c e s ,  c e t e r i s  par ibus,  t h e  domestic economy ' 
w i l l  experience an apprec ia t ion  i n  t h e  r a t e  of exchange, c r e a t i n g  
the re fo re ,  a  s t ronger  currency. 
Clements' r e l a t i o n  of P = SPr assumes t h a t  a l l  of t h e  goods 
and se rv ices  produced i n  a domestic economy a r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
traded. However, we know i n  r e a l i t y  t h i s  need no t  be t h e  case.  
Clements developed t h e  second p a r t  of h i s  ana lys i s  which r e l a t e s  
t h e  domestic p r i c e  l e v e l  t o  t h e  p r i c e  of t raded goods only, through 
t h e  use of purchasing power p a r i t y .  This has proven t o  be a more 
r e a l i s t i c  ana lys i s .  I f  w e  l e t  PT* be t h e  corresponding fore ign  
p r i c e  of goods t raded;  PT t h e  domestic p r i c e  of t raded goods and 
P N  t h e  domestic p r i c e  of non-traded goods we have the  following 
condition: 
P = Pf (PT, P N )  
P ~ l  
Figure 3 
Curve AA i s  represen ta t ive  of t h e  absolu te  l e v e l s  of p r i c e s  i n  
t h e  domestic economy a s  a funct ion of t h e  domestic p r i c e  of t raded 
goods and t h e  domestic p r i c e  of non-traded goods. The p r i c e  l e v e l  
represented by AA is  assumed cons tant  throughout. When inc reases  
a r e  experienced i n  PT and P N ,  r i s e s  i n  t h e  genera l  l e v e l  of P r i c e s  
of t h e  domestic country w i l l  be experienced. This would cause 
t h e  AA schedule t o  s h i f t  t o  t h e  r i g h t .  
Assume t h a t  d i s  designated a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  of non- 
t raded goods t o  t raded goods. Then PT = PN. Fur ther  assuming 
t h a t  income and technology remain r e l a t i v e l y  cons tant ,  then schedule 
OR i s  rep resen ta t ive  of t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  of non-traded goods t o  
t raded goods. Equilibrium w i l l  be e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  po in t  Eo which 
i s  where t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  a r e  equal  t o  t h e  absolu te  p r i c e  l eve l s .  
The impact of t h i s  r e l a t i o n  on t h e  r a t e  of exchange i s  shown through 
t h e  purchasing power p a r i t y .  A r i s e  i n  t h e  domestic l e v e l  of abso- 
l u t e  p r i c e s  w i l l  i nc rease  t h e  p r i c e  of domestic t raded goods ( P T ) ,  
causing t h e  exchange r a t e  t o  decrease.  A decrease i n  t h e  exchange 
r a t e  w i l l  be of t h e  same magnitude a s  t h e  inc rease  i n  t h e  p r i c e  
l e v e l s .  Long run condit ions a r e  somewhat more sub jec t ive  i n  t h i s  
kind of ana lys i s .  I n  t h e  s h o r t  run the  p r i c e s  of domestic non-traded 
goods could be assumed t o  be "s t icky"  downward. This may be due t o  
l ags  of information, c o s t s  of a d j u s t i n g  t o  the  runs, etc. 
Changes i n  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  with P N  cons tant  s h i f t s  t h e  AA l i n e  
t o  a new equi l ibr ium poin t .  Therefore,  t h e  brunt  of t h e  adjustment 
i s  c a r r i e d  by PT. The exchange r a t e  i s  deprec ia ted  t o  S2, then 
a t  equi l ibr ium we have E 2 ,  PT2, and PNo. Assuming t h a t  na t iona l  
income i n  t h e  domestic country s t a y s  cons tant ,  excess demand f o r  
non-traded goods w i l l  be experienced, I n  the  long-run, reLat ive  
p r i c e s  may f a l l  r e tu rn ing  t h e  p r i c e  of non-traded goods ( L )  t o  
i t s  normal l eve l .  The exchange r a t e  w i l l  experience f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  
t h e  s h o r t  run, while  experiencing e i t h e r  decreases  o r  inc reases  i n  
value over t h e  longer  run. 
A s  Table 1 i l l u s t r a t e s ,  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  i n  ~ e x i c o  a s  
compared t o  t h a t  i n  t h e  U.S .  f a i r l y  wel l  accounts f o r  t h e  increase  
i n  t h e  peso p r i c e  of d o l l a r s .  Looked a t  i n  another  way, t h e  ex- 
cess  demand was r e l a t i v e l y  g r e a t e r  i n  Mexico than i n  t h e  U.S., 
causing demand-pull i n f l a t i o n .  A s i g n i f i c a n t  amount of t h i s  was 
caused by t h e  s i z e  of pub l i c  budget d e f i c i t s ,  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  U.S. took remedial ac t ion  t o  slow i n f l a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  Mexico's 
e f f o r t s .  Table 2 p resen t s  some d a t a  on Mexico's aggregate demand 
and supply growth r a t e s .  
Terms  of Trade 
So f a r ,  we have s a i d  very l i t t l e  about t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of t h e  
exchange r a t e  t o  t h e  terms of t rade .  While t h e  fo re ign  exchange of 
a country i s  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  p r i c e s ,  adjustment i n  
money p r i c e s  usual ly  imply adjustments i n  t h e  r a t i o s  of t h e  terms of 
t rade .  We have seen t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of p r i c e s  a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
O r d i n a r y  R a t i o  P-P-P 
P r i c e s  P r i c e s  P-P-P Ex. R a t e  t o  o r d i n a r y  
Month  ~ e x i c o l  u , s . ~  Ex.  ate^ ( c o n t r o l l e d )  Ex. R a t e s  
J a n u a r y  7 7  1 0 0 . 0 0  1 0 0 . 0 0  2 2 . 1 8  22 .18  1 0 0 . 0 0  
December  7 7  1 1 5 . 4 6  1 0 5 . 4 5  24 .28  2 2 . 7 4  1 0 6 . 7 7  I 
December  79  1 6 0 . 3 3  1 3 2 . 5 9  26.82 22 .87  1 1 7 . 2 7  
December 80 202 .66  1 4 9 . 2 8  3 0 . 1 1  23 .26  1 2 9 . 4 5  
December 8 1  257 .17  1 5 7 . 1 7  36 .38  26 .23  1 3 8 . 7 0  I 
F e b r u a r y  82 2 8 1 . 8 8  1 5 8 . 7 3  39 .39  44 .64  88 .24  I 
J u n e  82  339 .67  1 5 9 . 0 7  47 .36  48 .04  98 .59  I 
A u g u s t  82 398.99  1 5 9 . 6 2  55 .44  4 9 . 8 1  111 .30  I 
December 82 496 .83  1 6 2 . 8 3  6 7 . 6 8  96 .48  70 .15  
'Whole P r i c e  I n d e x  f o r  Mexico C i t y .  J a n u a r y  1977=100.00 I 
2Wholesale P r i c e  I n d e x ,  " A l l  C o m m o d i t i e s .  I' J a n u a r y  1977=100.00 I 
3 ~ s s u m e s  t h a t  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  e x c h a n g e  rate i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 7  
w a s  t h e  P-P-P e x c h a n g e  rate. 
Table 2 
Aggregate Demand and Supply 
Real Growth Rates  
1978 1979 1980 
--- 
Aggregate Demand 
I n t e r n a l  Demand (1) 9.2 10.9 11.2 
P r i v a t e  
Consumption 
Investment 
Pub l i c  
Consumption 
Investment 
Exte rna l :  Exports  11.6 12.1  6 .1  5.7 8.8 -10 .4  
Aggregate Supply 
I n t e r n a l  Supply (GDP) 8.2 9.2 8.3 8.1 8.5 - 0.7 
Ex te rna l  Supply: Imports  21.9 29.9 31.9 18.5 25.4 -35.5 
- - 
(1) Inc ludes  changes i n  i n v e n t o r i e s  
Source: Mins i t ry  of  Planning and t h e  Budget 
exchange. The terms of  t r a d e  a r e  de f ined  a s  t h e  p r i c e  of imports  
i n  t e r m s  of  expor t s .  I t  s i g n i f i e s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  of imports  
t o  expor t s .  The terms of t r a d e  can be de f ined  a s :  
PN 
P ( terms of  t r a d e )  = S (m-j 
When a  count ry  deva lues  t h e i r  cur rency ,  a s  Mexico d i d  l a s t  y e a r ,  
f o r e i g n  money c o s t s  more i n  t e r m s  of domestic money. S ince  
f o r e i g n  money i s  needed t o  purchase f o r e i g n  goods, f o r e i g n  goods 
a l s o  c o s t  more i n  terms of domestic money. I t  a l s o  means t h a t  
domestic money i s  cheaper i n  terms of f o r e i g n  money, s o  t h a t  
domestic goods a r e  a l s o  cheaper  f o r  f o r e i g n e r s  t o  buy. 
However, t h e  f u l l  impact of deva lua t ion  o r  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of 
t h e  n a t i o n a l  cur rency  i n  t e r m s  of ano ther  i s  dependent upon t h e i r  
r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t i e s .  When t h e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a r e  l a r g e  
t h e  change i n  t h e  terms of  t r a d e  produced by deva lua t ion  w i l l  
b r ing  l a r g e  i n c r e a s e s  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  balance.  Low e l a s t i -  
c i t i e s  would have l i t t l e  impact.  I n  t h e  c a s e  of Mexico, t h e  
government hopes t h a t  t h e  cheaper  peso w i l l  encourage more ex- 
p o r t s  because it a l lows  companies t o  s e l l  p roduc ts  cheaply,  and 
t h u s  more compe t i t i ve ly  abroad.  
Exchange Cont ro l  
Exchange c o n t r o l  i s  an  exchange r a t e  regime t h a t  f a v o r s  d i r e c t  
government c o n t r o l s  over  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  monetary t r a n s a c t i o n s .  I n  
t h i s  c a s e  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  d i r e c t l y  admin i s t e r  exchanges of f o r e i g n  
cur rency  f o r  n a t i o n a l  monies. C i t i z e n s  who a c q u i r e  f o r e i g n  cur-  
rency by s e l l i n g  goods, s e r v i c e s  o r  assets t o  f o r e i g n e r s  may be 
r equ i r ed  t o  s e l l  t h a t  cur rency  t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  f o r  domestic 
money, and c i t i z e n s  who wish t o  buy goods, s e r v i c e s  and a s s e t s  
from abroad may need t o  apply t o  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  f o r  t h e  fo re ign  
currency they required.  
This does n o t  necessa r i ly  mean t h a t  exchange c o n t r o l  i s  a 
s t r i n g e n t  o r  bad pol icy  f o r  those s e c t o r s  of t h e  economy doing 
business  with fore igners .  I f  a l l  t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  were doing 
was buying and s e l l i n g  of fo re ign  exchange a t  a p r i c e  t h a t  equated 
r e c e i p t s  t o  s a l e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  would then be l i k e  having a f l o a t i n g  
exchange r a t e  regime with t h e  s t a t e  a c t i n g  a s  a clearinghouse.  
However, a s  w e  w i l l  s ee  i n  t h e  case of Mexico, t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s '  
wi l l ingness  t o  d e a l  and terms of these  dea l ings  with t h e  n a t i o n a l s  
depends on t h e  i d e n t i t y  of t h e  c i t i z e n ,  t h e  na tu re  of t h e  com- 
modity t h e  c i t i z e n  wants t o  buy o r  s e l l ,  and t h e  fore ign  country 
he wants t o  d e a l  with. 
The Exchange Rate, Adjustments and P o l i c i e s  
There a r e  two broad impl ica t ions  of exchange r a t e  adjustment. 
F i r s t ,  balance of payment d e f i c i t s  and surp luses  can be co r rec ted  
o r  prevented by v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  exchange r a t e .  Second, exchange 
r a t e  v a r i a t i o n s  allows ind iv idua l  coun t r i e s  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e i r  own 
money suppl ies .  Adjustments i n  t h e  exchange r a t e  can be c a r r i e d  
ou t  i n  four  d i s t r i c t  scenar ios .  Nat ional  currency could be depre- 
c i a t e d ,  which means domestic currency becomes worth l e s s  i n  t e r m s  
of fore ign  currency. S imi lar ly ,  na t iona l  currency can apprec ia te  o r  
inc rease  i n  value i n  terms of fore ign  currencies .  When a country 
i s  on t h e  gold s tandard,  i t s  currency can be devalued. This i s  a 
reduction in the value of the currency relative to its monetary 
standard, i.e., gold. It could also be revalued, meaning an in- 
crease in the relative value of the currency in terms of its monetary 
standard. When a national currency, like the Mexican peso, is de- 
valued, the devaluation reduces the value of the currency in terms 
of gold while other currencies are worth the same in terms of gold. 
Thus, it means that the peso in this case is also worth less in 
terms of the other currencies. 
Governments need to exercise great caution and care when de- 
ciding which scenario of exchange control adjustment to follow and 
must analyze their implications. The specific policies to be de- 
veloped by the affected government must be developed to operate 
efficiently in an internal and an international sphere, since the 
pursuit of these policies will have a tremendous impact in their bal- 
ance of payment accounts and current accounts as well as national 
aggregate demand. 
For internal and external balances under a fixed rate of ex- 
change system, government authorities have two ways of instituting 
their desired goals, fiscal policy and monetary policy. When author- 
ities are able and willing to sterilize payment imbalances so that 
they can exercise their independent monetary policies, they are 
controlling interest rates. We know that changes in interes-k-rates 
could stimulate or curtail aggregate demand which in turn affects 
national income. We have also seen the impact of interest rates in 
the determination of the rate of exchange. Fiscal poLicy on the 
other hand affects the budget deficit, which in turn impacts the 
external balance. An increase in the government deficit, by stim- 
ulating income and therefore imports, will tend to increase the bal- 
ance of payment deficit. An increase in the interest rate will de- 
crease the payment deficit for two reasons. By reducing national 
income, it reduces imports and so decreases the balance of trade 
deficit; a higher interest rate also makes domestic assets more at- 
tractive relative to the foreign assets and so generates a capital 
account surplus provided that capital is internationally mobile. 
These conclusions are short run conclusions and offer only tempo- 
rary relief from the internal-external balance dilemma. Since it 
requires a long time for the effect of fiscal and monetary policy to 
take place, short run effects of fiscal and monetary policy in the 
current account could be over before fiscal policy even begins to 
do its thing. 
As related to the Mexican situation, fiscal and monetary poli- 
cies were implemented. On May 16. 1982, "the Minister of Program- 
ming and Budget, Ramdn Aguerre Velazquez, announced measures adopted 
by the Federal Government to attenuate the negative effects of de- 
valuation and strengthen the fight against inflation." He went on 
to announce that, "it is asserted that as a result of the deval- 
uation the budgetary scheme had been altered, both because of the 
effects on debt service and on the wage adjustment decree to make 
good the loss in purchasing power of the workers. As a consequence 
there was a need to reduce public sector expenditure. 
Table 3 
Federal Expenditures Budget 1982 
(Billions of pesos) 
Original budgeted expenditure 3,320.6 
Less: personal services 589.5 
Debt servicing 722.1 
State and municipalities 
shares in Federal taxes 193.8 1,505.4 
Adjustable budgetary expenditure 1,815.2 
Reduction 
% of reduction in terms of original budget 
% of reduction in terms of adjustable 
expenditure 
Source: Ministry of Programming and Budget 
The decision had been made not to permit any budget increase (see 
Table 3). The budget will be reduced by a total of 150 billion 
pesos or 8.3% in the areas indicated and 4.5% of the original 
budget as a whole. 
111. PROBLEMS FOR MEXICO 
These c o l l e c t e d  p o l i c i e s  a r e  expected t o  a l t e r  Mexico's 
course--recession followed by slow growth i n  GDP. De l a  Madrid 
must win t h e  cooperation of organized l abor  a s  we l l  a s  t h a t  of t h e  
1 . 6  mi l l ion  pub l i c  s e r v i c e  employees. Increased unemployment 
makes t h i s  problem more d i f f i c u l t ,  a s  may any s i z a b l e  reduct ion 
i n  the  publ ic  work force.  
I n f l a t i o n ,  f i n a n c i a l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  a genera l  f e e l i n g  of un- 
r e s t ,  and t h e  U.S. recess ion  have a l l  combined t o  reduce tourism 
revenues, I f  nothing e l s e ,  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  tourism 
revenues have made planning much more d i f f i c u l t  than was t h e  case 
from 1 9 6 0  t o  1 9 7 0  when these  revenues rose  10.3 percent  annuallyand 
%a 1970-1980 they increased 1 4 . 9 %  per  year. Border t r ansac t ions  
follow t h e  same p a t t e r n  as  tourism, compounding t h e  problem. 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  both t h e  labor  problem and tourism problem a r e  
t i e d  t o  i n f l a t i o n .  From January 1977 t o  December 1982 t h e  WPI 
f o r  Mexico Ci ty  increased almost 400 percent .  Even with t h e  p o l i c i e s  
enacted by t h e  de l a  Madrid government, i n f l a t i o n  i s  expected t o  
remain s t rong  through 1985. On t h e  p o s i t i v e  s ide ,  t h e  acce le ra t ing  
t rend may be broken. I f  so ,  t h e  impact on t o u r i s t  t r a d e  and wage 
se t t lements  could be very s e t t l i n g  on t h e  economy. 
A f i n a l  problem faced by Mexico r e l a t e s  t o  bus iness '  i n a b i l i t y  
t o  obta in  ( a t  low c o s t )  t h e  d o l l a r s  needed t o  import ma te r i a l s  
necessary f o r  production. Not only do exchange c o n t r o l s  increase  
t h e  c o s t  of imports, they can be used t o  r a t i o n  fore ign  exchange 
and thereby l i m i t  imports d i r e c t l y .  
On September 1, 1982, t h e  then Pres ident  of Mexico Jos6 
LQpez P o r t i l l o  signed i n t o  law a  "Decree Regarding Generalized 
Exchange Control." This decree es t ab l i shed  t h e  Cent ra l  Bank of 
Mexico a s  t h e  s t a t e  clearinghouse dea l ing  with matters  of fore ign  
exchange. The decree f u r t h e r  e s t ab l i shed  t h a t  fore ign  currency 
w i l l  no t  be l e g a l  tender  i n  t h e  na t ion  and fore ign  currency w i l l  
be exchanged a t  t h e  appropr ia te  r a t e s ,  through t h e  Cent ra l  Bank. 
Control of the  e x i t  and e n t r y  of fore ign  currencies  were a l s o  estab-  
l i shed .  The s o l e  purpose of t h i s  c o n t r o l  condi t ion i s  t o  prevent 
c a p i t a l  , (do l l a r i za t ion)  f l i g h t  from t h e  na t ion  t o  fore ign  banks. 
I n  t h i s  decree,  t h e  Mexican p res iden t  e s t ab l i shed  a  two t i e r e d  ex- 
change r a t e  regime--the p r e f e r e n t i a l  exchange r a t e  and t h e  ordinary 
r a t e .  
On September 4 ,  1982, Carlos Tel lo ,  Direc tor  of t h e  Bank of 
Mexico, explained i n  a  p ress  conference t h e  new system of exchange 
cont ro l .  He es tab l i shed  t h a t  t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  r a t e  f ixed  a t  $50 
Mex. ($105 today) t o  t h e  U.S. d o l l a r  " w i l l  apply t o  a l l  imports of 
goods authorized by t h e  Minis try of Trade." The second exchange 
rate--the ordinary f ixed  a t  $70 Mex. ($150 today) t o  t h e  U.S. d o l l a r  
w i l l  apply t o  a l l  exports  of goods and se rv ices ,  imports of se r -  
v ices  among which tourism i s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  force  and a l l  payments 
of p r i n d i p a l  and i n t e r e s t  corresponding t o  depos i t s  i n  fore ign  
currency. 
I n  an a r t i c l e  which appeared i n  t h e  Wall S t r e e t  Journal  on 
March 11, 1983, Lynda Schuster p resen t s  seve ra l  a c t u a l  cases  i n  
which t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s '  wi l l ingness  t o  dea l  o r  lack thereof  i s  
a f f e c t i n g  t h e  funct ioning of t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. Companies t h a t  
20  
during t h e  l a s t  3 0  years  never had any problems obta in ing  money 
and mate r i a l s  needed t o  t u r n  a c r o f i t ,  a r e  f ind ing  it almost impos- 
/ 
s i b l e  t o  s t a y  a f l o a t .  These companies were importing raw mate r i a l s  
from t h e  U . S .  r a t h e r  inexpensively,  but  due t o  t h e  devaluat ion of 
the  peso and t h e  exchange con t ro l  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  
one. Their  exports  might be more a t t r a c t i v e  abroad b u t  imports 
have become more expensive, c r e a t i n g  production bot t lenecks .  
The government, through t h e  Cent ra l  Bank, says  t h a t  l e s s  
expensive d o l l a r s  ( t h e  p r e f e r e n t i a l  r a t e )  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  c r u c i a l  
imports. But merchants and entrepreneurs  t h a t  t r i e d  t o  g e t  these  
d o l l a r s  from t h e  Cent ra l  Bank f i n d  o u t  t h a t  these  d o l l a r s  a r e  d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  g e t  o r  simply c a n ' t  be l i b e r a t e d  from t h e  Mexican bureau- 
cracy. The a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  f o r  the  entrepreneurs  t o  buy t h e  neces- 
s a r y  d o l l a r s  a t  t h e  free-market r a t e  o r  i n  t h e  black market. Most 
of them cannot a f f o r d  t o ,  making t h e  importing of t h e  necessary 
raw mate r i a l s  almost impossible. 
The s o l u t i o n ,  according t o  t h e  Mexican government, i s  t o  de- 
c rease  imports and change t o  l o c a l  raw mate r i a l s .  But t o  make t h i s  
change f i rms need t o  buy machinery t o  handle the  l o c a l  ma te r i a l s ;  
they need once again those "phantomn d o l l a r s  t o  acqui re  t h e  new 
machinery, s i n c e  Mexico produces very small  quan t i ty  of c a p i t a l  
goods. Assuming t h a t  a f i rm can overcome t h e  obs tac les  mentioned 
above, a f t e r  h i s  fore ign  s a l e s  a r e  made then h i s  dea l ings  with t h e  
Cent ra l  Bank begin, He w i l l  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  r e c e i p t s  a r e  paid 
through t h e  Cent ra l  Bank, a t  t h e  lower r a t e  of exchange. 
I V .  PROBLEMS FOR THE U.S. 
I Mexico i s  t h e  United S t a t e s '  t h i r d  l a r g e s t  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r ,  
a f t e r  Canada and Japan. I n  1982, t r a d e  between t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  
t o t a l e d  $31.6 b i l l i o n .  The main U.S. imports  w e r e  o i l  (552,000 
bbl .  p e r  day, worth $6.2 b i l l i o n  annua l ly )  and n a t u r a l  gas  (300 
m i l l i o n  cu. f t .  p e r  day ) .  U n t i l  t h e  economic c r i s i s ,  Mexico had 
become an i n c r e a s i n g l y  impor tan t  consumer of U.S. manufactured 
goods, machinery and s e r v i c e s .  Because of i t s  e x t e r n a l  d e b t  pro- 
blem, Mexico c u t  i t s  imports  back d r a s t i c a l l y  i n  1982. U.S. ex- 
p o r t s  f e l l  by 60 pe rcen t ,  and t h e  U.S. $ 4  b i l l i o n  t r a d e  s u r p l u s  
wi th  Mexico became a  $ 4  b i l l i o n  d e f i c i t  i n  1982. Es t imates  i n d i -  
c a t e  t h i s  change has  c o s t  t h e  U.S. economy 200,000 jobs. Fu ture  
c u t s  i n  imports  by Mexico w i l l  con t inue  t o  " shu t  o f f "  one of t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l  coun t ry ' s  main engines  of growth. 5  
The deva lua t ion  and import  r e s t r i c t i o n s  have s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
h u r t  U.S. border  r e t a i l e r s  wi th  consequent e f f e c t s  on employment. 
Decreased expendi tures  have caused s a l e s  t a x e s  t o  plummet. When 
viewed a long  wi th  Reagan's c u t s  i n  funding f o r  s t a t e  and l o c a l  
governments, t h e  e f f e c t  on p u b l i c  employment i s  obvious. 6 
U.S. i n v e s t o r s  i n  Mexico a r e  i n  a p reca r ious  p o s i t i o n .  In-  
c luded are i n d i v i d u a l s ,  f i rms ,  and banks. A f t e r  t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a -  
t i o n ,  d o l l a r  accounts  w e r e  conver ted t o  pesos ,  and a l i m i t  w a s  
p leased  on t h e  pesos t h a t  could be removed from Mexico t o  5,000. 
The Reagan admin i s t r a t i on  has  o f f e r e d  a i d  t o  U.S. banking i n t e r -  
ests,  b u t  n o t  U.S. c i t i z e n s .  U.S. banks have made a  l a r g e  q u a n t i t y  
of loans t o  Mexico. The nine l a r g e s t  U.S.  banks have loaned 
6 0 %  of t h e i r  shanreholders '  equ i ty ,  and smaller  banks i n  t h e  
Southwest a r e  vulnerable.  According t o  one view, overeager lenders  
a r e  a s  respons ib le  f o r  Mexico's f i n a n c i a l  problems a s  t h e  over- 
eager borrower. The p o s s i b i l i t y  of d e f a u l t  could s e r i o u s l y  d is -  
rup t  t h e  U.S .  banking system. 
V. I M F  AND STABILIZATION 
The November 10, 1982, agreement between Mexico and t h e  I M F  
l a i d  out  a program t o  promote economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n  and ease  t h e  
repayment of fore ign  debts .  Some observers  f e e l  t h a t  t h e  IMF's  
a u s t e r i t y  p lan  may be somewhat se l f -defea t ing ,  leading not  t o  
manageable debt  and growth but  r a t h e r  con t rac t ions  i n  both Mexico 
and the  U.S .  
Most f o r e c a s t s  of Mexico's economic f u t u r e  under I M F  con- 
s t r a i n t s  suggest  a con t rac t ion  i n  GDP and an increase  i n  unemploy- 
m&nt i n  1983, and slow sus ta ined  growth over t h e  next  few years .  
I n f l a t i o n  i s  expected t o  moderate a s  the  r a t i o  of the  d e f i c i t  t o  
GDP f a l l s ,  and t h e  r a t e  of growth i n  t h e  money supply decreases.  
V I .  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The chief  problems faced by Mexico can be grouped i n  two cate-  
gor ies :  e x t e r n a l  and inbernal .  Externa l  problems a r e  those t h a t  
Mexico must take  as  given. These include t h e  recovery of t h e  U.S. 
economy, t h e  world p r i c e  of o i l  and i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  U.S .  economic 
recovery seems t o  be c r i t i c a l  t o  economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n  i n  Mexico. 
Both o i l  and non-oi l  e x p o r t s  t o  t h e  U.S. could e x h i b i t  a  s i g -  
n i f i c a n t l y  improved performance. The c u r r e n t  low l e v e l  of o i l  con- 
sumption w i l l  l i k e l y  be reversed  a s  U.S. manufacturing rebounds, 
as f o r  non-oil  e x p o r t s ,  t h e s e  have an e l a s t i c i t y ,  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  
U.S. GNP,  g r e a t e r  t han  one. Therefore ,  it would n o t  be s u r p r i s i n g  
i f  e x p o r t s  l e a d  t h e  p o s t  1983 expansion i n  Mexico. The peso de- 
v a l u a t i o n  has  reduced t h e  c o s t  of Mexican e x p o r t s  i n  U.S .  d o l l a r s ,  
making t h e s e  goods and s e r v i c e s  even more a t t r a c t i v e .  I n  a s i m i l a r  
ve in ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  demand f o r  o i l  should slow t h e  downward 
movement i n  i t s  p r i c e ,  and e v e n t u a l l y  probably r e s t o r e  it t o  pre-  
v ious  l e v e l s .  Wharton Econometrics has  e s t ima ted  a $ 2  change i n  
t h e  world p r i c e  would change Mexican GNP by 3 . 7  percen t .  F i n a l l y ,  
i f  i n f l a t i o n  cont inues  t o  moderate i n  t h e  U.S., i n t e r e s t s  r a t e s  
could d i p ,  thereby  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  reducing Mexico's deb t  s e r v i c e  
problems. 
The two key i n t e r n a l  problems f a c i n g  Mexico seem t o  be t h e  
r a t i o  of t h e  d e f i c i t  t o  GNP,  and t h e  r a t e  of growth i n  t h e  money 
supply.  Not on ly  w i l l  government expend i tu re s  need t o  be re- I 
s t r a i n e d ,  b u t  Looney and Freder iksen  have argued a t a x  reform i s  
c r i t i c a l  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  economy i n  t h e  fu tu re .*  Money supply 
growth i s  expected t o  slow from 66  pe rcen t  i n  1983, and t h i s  t o o  
i s  very s i g n i f i c a n t .  
It i s  c l e a r  t h a t  from t h e  d a t a  p re sen ted  above, Mexico's 
huge a n t i c i p a t e d  o i l  revenues w e r e  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  i t s  ambit ious  
growth program. S ince  Mexico's growth was s t i l l  modeled a f t e r  an 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  model with i t s  emphasis i n  inward growth, 
Mexico continued t o  borrow from fore ign  sources,  inc reas ing  i t s  
debt ,  When t h e  o i l  revenues f a i l e d  t o  ma te r i a l i ze ,  t h e  country 
found i t s e l f  overextended t o  such a degree t h a t  it could no t  meet 
i t s  fo re ign  debt  commitments due t o  i t s  l i q u i d i t y  problems. Mexico 
d i d  no t  have any o the r  choice but  t o  t ake  tough and s t r i n g e n t  mea- 
su res  t o  keep t h e  s i t u a t i o n  under con t ro l .  A t  home t h e  new admin- 
i s t r a t i o n  has reduced t h e  budget t o  t h e  ba re  e s s e n t i a l s  and new 
monetary r u l e s ,  including exchange con t ro l  and t h e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  
of t h e  banking system were implemented. Abroad, Mexico i s  working 
on t h e  rescheduling of i t s  debt  and new f inancing through t h e  I M F  
and o the r s .  
The Mexican-American r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s o  interwoven t h a t  it i s  
impossible t o  completely unravel t h e  interdependence between 
American and Mexican business.  However, it seems t h a t  i n  most pro- 
b a b i l i t y  it w i l l  increase .  The U.S. can t ake  advantage of t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  by providing Mexico with t h e  necessary funds t o  re- 
s t r u c t u r e  t h e i r  debt.  I n  r e t u r n ,  t h e  U . S .  ob ta ins  cheaper o i l  and 
n a t u r a l  gas. The U.S .  can a l s o  obta in  r e l a x a t i o n  from t h e  
Mexicans regarding t h e i r  pro tec t ionary  p o l i c i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  imports 
and investment i n  Mexico. 
A t  f i r s t  glance one might aonclude t h a t  t h e  exchange cont ro l  
exerc ised  by Mexico would decrease American exports .  However, one 
needs t o  look c l o s e r ,  Mexico i s  n o t  a producer of c a p i t a l  goods. 
Most of t h e i r  c a p i t a l  equipment i s  dependent on American indus t ry .  
A l a r g e  proport ion of t h e  imports of Mexico a r e  imports of U.S.  
in termediate  products.  I n  t u r n  these  in termedia te  products a r e  
t ransforced  i n t o  f i n a l  products and exported t o  t h e  U.S. I f  t h e  
Mexican economy i s  t o  s t a r t  moving again,  t h e i r  fore ign  debt  needs 
t o  be r e s t r u c t u r e d  based on more r e a l i s t i c  p ro jec t ions  of o i l  re- 
venues; o i l  production may need t o  be increased and re laxa t ion  and 
adjustments regarding t h e  imports of raw mate r i a l s  and intermediate  
goods from t h e  U.S. need t o  be es tabl i shed .  
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